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BANK PROCEDURES AND THE U.C.C.-WHEN IS A
CHECK FINALLY PAID?
I. INTRODUCTION
As checks have supplanted currency as the accepted medium of exchange
for transfer of assets and payment of obligations, an increasing importance
has been placed upon bank collection procedures for such items. Article 4
of the Uniform Commercial Code is the most recent and most comprehensive
attempt at regulation of the aspects of banking concerned with the procedure
by which a bank receives and decides whether to pay an item drawn on it. 1
The purported basic purpose of this regulation is to provide uniformity in
the rules governing the collection process, including the regulations concern-
ing the concept of "final payment." 2
The concept of final payment is central to the scheme of Article 4
because the time of final payment of a check or similar item is the starting
point for determining the rights and obligations of a number of parties in
relation to an item. When final payment occurs, the payor bank 5 is deemed
to be accountable to the presenting party for the amount of the item. 4 At
the same time the drawer of the instrument is relieved of liability to the
holder because the amount is deemed to have been paid. 5 Also, if the payor
bank becomes insolvent and suspends payment once final payment has
occurred, the owner of an item will have a preferred claim against the payor
bank for the amount.° Final payment, furthermore, is one of the occurrences
which can prevent the "four legals"—notice,7 stop-order, 8 legal process5 and
setoffw—from being effective to prevent actual payment of the item.' 1
1 See U.C.C. § 4-101, Comment. All Code citations are to the 1962 Official Text,
unless otherwise indicated.
2 U.C.C. § 4-213. See Malcolm, Article 4—A Battle With Complexity, 1952 Wis. L.
Rev. 265, 270. Malcolm was one of the original draftsmen of Article 4, and later
served as chairman for the Subcommittee on Article 4 for the 1958 Edition.
3 "Payor bank" is defined in U.C.C. § 4-105 as the bank by which an item is payable
as drawn or accepted.
U.C.C. § 4-213(1) "Presentment" is the holder's demand that the payor bank
pay or accept the check, or it is such a demand made on behalf of the holder. See U.C.C.
§ 3-504(1).
5 U.C.C. § 3-603(1). The liability of the drawer and any indorsers is dependent
upon dishonor. U.C.C. §§ 3-413(2), -414(1). Final payment by the payor bank necessarily
precludes dishonor because liability of the bank to the holder is thereby established.
6 U.C.C. § 4-214(2). If final payment has not occured, then the trustee, receiver, or
agent of the closed bank may return the item. U.C.C. § 4-214(1).
7 "Notice" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(25) as notification of the fact in question—
for example, the bankruptcy of the drawer.
8 A stop-order is an order by the drawer to the payer hank not to honor an item
drawn on his account. See U.C.C. § 4-303, Comment 1.
9 Legal process is judicial action such as attachment, execution or injunction. See
§ 4-303, Comment 1.
10 Setoff is a right of the payor bank to charge a sum against the drawer's account.
See U.C.C. § 4-303, Comment 1.
11 U.C.C. § 4-303 provides that "[alny knowledge, notice or stop-order received by,
legal process served upon or setoff exercised by a payor bank . . . comes too late . . ."
when the bank has done any of certain specified acts. The actions listed in the section
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Provisional settlement, the credit given by the payor bank to the party
presenting an item for collection," becomes final when final payment is
made, as does credit for the item between the presenting bank," other
collecting banks14
 and the customer seeking payment for the item." Final
payment, moreover, marks the end of the collection process and the beginning
of the remitting process, whereby the amount of the item is returned to the
party demanding payment."
The problems involved in defining final payment are particularly sig-
nificant in light of the considerable volume of checks presently being handled
by banks. 17 Commercial banks in the United States handle more than seventy
million items every day," and this volume is increasing by about seven
percent each year." To accommodate this ever-increasing flow, the banks
have sought the allowance of a considerable period of time for their de-
terminations concerning payment in order to assure themselves ample
opportunity to examine thoroughly all the items received. 20
With the increasing volume, however, arguments concerning the pro-
tection of other interests have developed, which militate against the un-
limited extension of such a time period. Checks and similar items are forms
of credit, and thus represent a certain risk to the person who accepts them
as a method of payment. Unlike the case with cash, when a check is taken
there is always a possibility that payment on it will not be made. 21 Such
nonpayment may result from the intervention of bankruptcy or the "four
legals," or the insufficiency of adequate funds to pay for the item. If pay-
ment is delayed to allow more time for handling, this delay increases the
opportunity for a conflicting interest to intervene and prevent payment from
being effected.22 In order to reduce this risk, one goal of check-collection
regulations is to make payment "final" as soon as possible.
include all those that may constitute final payment under U.C.C. § 4-213. See U.C.C.
§ 4-303, Comment 2.
12 When a payor bank "settles" for an item it pays for it "in cash, by clearing
house settlement, in a charge or credit or by remittance, or otherwise as instructed."
U.C.C. § 4-104(j). If this settlement is provisional, it is subject to a right of the payor
bank to return the item. See U.C.C. § 4-301(1).
13 "Presenting bank" is defined in U.C.C. § 4-105(e) as any bank presenting an
item except a payor bank.
14 "Collecting bank" is defined in U.C.C. § 4-105(d) as any bank handling the item
for collection except a payor bank.
15 U.C.C. §§ 4-213(2), (3).
18 U.C.C. 4-213, Comment 1.
17 See U.C.C. § 4-101, Comment.
18 Clarke, Check-Out Time for Checks, 83 Banking L.J. 847, 848 (1966).
19
 Id. at 850.
20 See, e.g., Bank Collection Code § 3. This Code was drafted by the American
Bankers Association. (It is superseded by the U.C.C. U.C.C. § 10-102.)
21 At present the percentage of "bad" items represents /70 of all items. The good
items presented cover 99g% of all the money transferred by check. Of those dishonored,
half are paid later. Thus the risk in taking a check involves only Ya% of the money so
transferred. Leary, Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 15 Pitt. L. Rev. 565, 569 (1954). Leary was one of the original draftsmen
of Article 4.
22 See U.C.C. § 4-303.
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A balancing of these two seemingly inconsistent objectives—speed in
handling and provision for sufficient time for the payor bank to handle items
—is necessary in order to fix a time for final payment which will reasonably
be acceptable in terms of both goals. 23
The Uniform Commercial Code has been drafted with apparent realiza-
tion of the need for such a balance. 24 Section 4-213 defines "final payment"
as follows:
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank
has done Ay of the following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to
revoke the settlement and without having such right
under statute, clearing house rule or agreement; or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the
indicated account of the drawer, maker or other per-
son to be charged therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and
failed to revoke the settlement in the time and man-
ner permitted by statute, clearing house rule or
agreement.
Upon a final payment under subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) the
payor bank shall be accountable for the amount of the item.
It is the purpose of this comment to examine in detail one particular
aspect of final payment under section 4-213 (1) (c), the "process of posting."
Process of posting is defined under section 4-109 as
the usual procedure followed by a payor bank in determining to
pay an item and recording the payment including one or more of
the following or other steps as determined by the bank:
(a) verification of any signature;
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;
(c) affixing a "paid" or other stamp;
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's account;
(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action with
respect to the item.
In this examination, the following will be considered: (1) the policy behind
the concept of final payment in view of prior law; and (2) the effect of the
process of posting as a reflection of this policy.
II. "FINAL PAYMENT" BEFORE THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Before uniform bank legislation was attempted, the rule as to when
payment was final was dependent upon local case and statutory law. A
variety of inconsistent rules evolved concerning the fixing of time for final
payment. 25 Some were based upon a differentiation between items presented
23 See Leary, supra note 21, at 570-71.
24 See U.C.C. §§ 4-101, Comment, -103, Comment 1. , 	 •
25 See Malcolm, How Bank Collection Works—Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 11 How. L.J. 71, 76 (1965).
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directly to the payor bank either for deposit or for cash ("on us" items),
and those presented otherwise, such as through the mails and clearing houses.
The traditional rule as to "on us" items was that the person presenting the
item directly to the payor bank received final payment when he received
either cash or credit to his account."
For items not presented directly, the majority rule was that final pay-
ment occurred and the bank became accountable for the amount when the
payor bank "posted"27 the item to the account of the drawer. 28 Rules in
other jurisdictions, however, provided that payment was final when an item
was stamped "paid," 29 when the item was retained for an unreasonable
time," when a remittance draft was accepted -by the presenting bank,31 or
when the remittance could no longer be retrieved by the payor bank.32
As check volume increased, those parties whose interests were dependent
upon final payment33 desired a single statement of the time of final payment
to end any possible confusion, especially in commercial transactions involving
collections from a bank located in a state with a different rule. Uniform
legislation was seen as the most suitable means for eliminating uncertainty. 34
The American Bankers Association attempted to unify the various rules
by promoting the adoption of the Bank Collection Code drafted by the
Association in 1928. This code retained the system of different rules for
"on us" items and for items presented to the payor bank indirectly." For "on
us" items, the . Bank Collection Code changed the prevailing common law
rule by making any credit given by the payor bank to the presenter dependent
upon later inspection of the account, rather than designating the time of
receipt of credit as the time of final payment." This allowed the payor bank
to postpone inspection of the drawer's account until after presentment so
26 2 Paton's Digest 1376 (1942) ; see, e.g., Briviesca v. Coronado, 19 Cal. 2d 244,
120 P.2d 649 (1941).
27 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1771 (1963), defines "posting" as
simply the transfer of entries to complete a record.
28 See Note, Bank Collection Under The Uniform Commercial Code, 38 Ind. L.J.
710, 714 & n.18 (1963).
29 Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 670 (1903).
20 Wisner v. First Nat'l Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 68 A. 955 (1908).
31 Page v. Holmes-Darst Coal Co., 269 Mich. 159, 256 N.W. 840 (1934).
32 This means that the payor bank was liable to its customer for failure to honor a
stop-order if it could "recapture" the remittance draft before it reached the presenting
bank. This has been called the "recapture" rule. In Bohlig v. First Nat'l Bank, 233 Minn.
523, 48 N.W.2d 445 (1951), the payor bank was held liable to the drawer of an item
because it did not have its remittance for the item withdrawn from the mails.
33 See p. 957 supra.
34 Early legislation dealing with checks, such as the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act, commonly referred to as the Negotiable Instruments Law, developed no definitive
rules in this area, presumably because at the time of its adoption the use of checks had not
reached sufficient proportions to cause any widespread concern over when final payment
occurs. Spanogle, The Bank-Depositor Relationship—A Comparison of the Present
Tennessee Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 79, 107 (1962). Thus
no attempt at uniform legislation was initially made to standardize the time of final
payment. See U.N.I.A. § 189.
35 Compare Bank Collection Code § 3 with U.N.I.A. § 7.
26 Bank Collection Code § 3. See Andrews, The City Clearing House: Payment,
Returns, and Reimbursement, 27 Lid. L.J. 155, 170 (1952).
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that items did not have to be inspected individually as they came in." For
items presented through the mail, the item was deemed finally paid when
the amount was debited to the account of the drawer." However, there was
no specific provision as to when the account was to be debited or how long
an item could be retained without being deemed finally paid. If the collecting
bank was unhappy about a delay in payment by the payor bank, it could
elect to treat the item as dishonored." If the payor bank used reasonable
diligence in dishonoring and returning an item, it was relieved of any
liability. 40 Emphasis in the Collection Code was thus placed upon protection
of the payor bank from liability by providing sufficient time for inspecting
and processing each item, with no strict deadline for making a decision.
The emphasis on bank protection was carried to such an extent that the
other objectives of an effective collection procedure—rapid handling and a
speedy determination to pay—were made secondary. The Bank Collection
Code, however, was adopted in only 18 states; 41 this absence of widespread
adoption resulted in a continuing general uncertainty.
III. THE CONCEPT OF "FINAL PAYMENT" UNDER THE U.C.C.
When Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code was being drafted,
the draftsmen indicated a general intent to correct the errors of previous
banking law through an effectuation of the necessary balance between the
bank's need for time and the customer's need for speed in payment 42 The
product of this drafting attempt, section 4-213, was considered to have
attained this balance and achieved uniformity,43 and was lauded as one of
the greatest potential benefits of Article 4. 44
Under the definition of final payment in section 4-213(1), all items are
treated alike regardless of how presented. This alone eliminates one artificial
distinction which the pre-Code law had created. The draftsmen also replaced
the many existing rules with one rule applicable to all situations and all
actions of the payor bank. By necessity the definition is technical, designating
final payment as the first of four distinct acts of the payor bank and covering
actions to be taken with respect to a variety of items, so that the time of
final payment might be ascertained regardless of the particular procedure
employed. The draftsmen realized that final payment of an item by the bank
might be evidenced by either an internal or an external manifestation. 46
Thus subsection (1) (a) of section 4-213 designates payment for an item
in cash as final and subsection (1) (b) lists settlement with the presenting
37 See 2 Paton's Digest 1376 (1942).
38 Bank Collection Code 7.
39 Id. § 11.
49 Id.	 12.
41 See 2 Paton's Digest 1372, 1378 (1942). The Bank Collection Code was also
adopted in Illinois, but was declared unconstitutional. Id. at 1373.
42 In the 1946 draft, § 1 of Article 4 stated a general policy of speed and certainty
in bank collections.
43 See Note, supra note 28, at 715.
44 Malcolm, supra note 25, at 82.
45 See U.C.C. § 4-213, Comments 3, 5.
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party without a right to revoke as indicative of final payment—both external
manifestations.
The section, in addition, lists two alternatives amounting to final pay-
ment as determined by internal action or inaction.,If a provisional settlement
for the item is made with the party presenting it, and the settlement is not
revoked by certain specified means, it becomes final under subsection (1) (d)
after the item is retained for a specified period of time. Statutes, agreements
and clearing house rules are used to set this time," The deadlines apply
both when no action is taken on an item and when action is not completed
before the deadline that has been set.47 If payment has not been made final
by the occurrence of the actions in subsections (a) through (c), the internal
act of retention of the item is sufficient. If a provisional settlement is made,
however, subsection (1) (c) provides that payment is final at the time the
process of posting is completed.
Adoption of section 4-213 was considered to have resolved the earlier
uncertainties as to final payment." The technical determination of the time
of final payment seemed sufficiently precise to prevent uncertainties. Further-
more, basing final payment upon the action of the payor bank achieved the
objective of providing sufficient protection for the bank; at the same time,
this was not significantly detrimental to the interest of the holder of an item
because of the payor's affirmative obligation to honor or dishonor and the
time limits imposed:"
However, problems soon arose over the meaning of the phrase "process
of posting" in subsection (1) (c). A new factor affecting collection procedures
created uncertainty in what had been thought to be an unambiguous defini-
tion of final payment. The ramifications of this new problem were sufficiently
great to induce the Permanent Editorial Board to draft a new provision, sec-
tion 4-109, further to define "process of posting."
This interpretative problem arose concommitantly with the addition of
computers to bank collection procedures. Previously the typical procedure in
check handling by the payor bank involved verification of signature, deter-
mination of sufficiency of funds, examination of the account for the "four
legals" and a final step of debiting the amount of the item to the drawer's
account. 6° With the adoption of computers, however, the standard procedure
is just the reverse. The common practice is to charge the item to the account
first, then to perform inspection and the other verification steps used by
banks in determining whether to pay an item. This practice enables a bank
to handle a large volume of items in a single computer run. If the later step
of examination of the account by a clerk shows that payment had been
stopped or that the signature was forged, reversing entries are made. 51
46 U.C.C. § 4-213(1) (d). One such time limit is the midnight deadline stipulated
in U.C.C. 4-301 for deferred posting.
47 See U.C.C. § 4-213, Comment 6.
48 Malcolm, supra note 25, at 82.
49 See U.C.C. § 4-213, Comment 7.
50 See 1 New York Law Revision Commission Report, Hearings on the Uniform
Commercial Code 108 (1954) ; 2 Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code Rep. 80-82 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 2 P.E.B. Rep.]
51 2 P.E.B. Rep. at 81.
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Since the Code draftsmen designated in section 4-213 that completion
of the process of posting would be final payment," bankers who used com-
puters became fearful of premature liability. In spite of the existence of a
suggested meaning in the official comments to section 4-213, 53 the lack of a
definition of "process of posting" in the text of the Code could have resulted
in adoption by a court of the traditional definition of posting," imposing
immediate liability upon the payor bank.
In California, the first state to adopt the use of computers in banking
on a large scale, the problem of interpreting "process of posting" was a factor
in the postponement until 1963 of the enactment of the U.C.C. 55 When the
Code was finally enacted in California, all references to the process of posting
were omitted."
In response to the problems caused by computers, section 4-109 was
adopted in 1962 by the Permanent Editorial Board." Section 4-109 defines
process of posting as the "usual procedure followed by a payor bank in
determining to pay an item and in recording the payment." 68 By defining
in such terms, the Permanent Editorial Board attempted to eliminate any
fears of a bank faced with either changing its procedure or incurring liability
before it has finished processing an item." The section's emphasis was placed
upon inclusion within the process of posting of two distinct elements, a
mechanical recording and a determination to pay. The definition goes even
further, however, by the inclusion in the text of section 4-109 of some of the
possible steps that might be included in the payor bank's usual procedure.
The draftsmen emphasized the fact that the order of the steps was immaterial;
thus, changes in banking procedure would fit within the definition, and
liability would be based upon an actual decision to pay. In Gibbs v. Ger-
berick," the first case interpreting section 4-109, 51 the definition was specif-
ically interpreted to mean that liability for payment would not occur pre-
maturely if charging of the account was the first step in the bank's process.
Thus, the addition of section 4-109 appeared to have resolved the difficulties
created by computerized banking."
The very efforts of the Editorial Board to resolve the process of posting
ambiguity, however, have resulted in definitional problems with section
52 U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(c).
53 U.C.C. § 4-213, Comment 5.
64 See Note, supra note 28, at 714.
55 2 P.E.B. Rep. at 80-82.
66 See W. Willier & F. Hart, 1 Uniform Commercial Code Reporter-Digest §§ 4-109,
-213 (1968).
57 The Permanent Editorial Board gave no official reason for the addition. However,
the problems with California's adoption were quite apparent. See 2 P.E.B. Rep, at 80-82.
58 See p. 959 supra, for the full provisions of § 4-109.
50 See Comment, Recent Uniform Commercial Code Developments, 5 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 360, 367 (1964).
60 1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E.2d 851 (1964).
61 Although § 4-109 was not yet in force in Ohio, the court used it as the basis for
its opinion. Id. at 97, 203 N.E.2d at 854.
62 In spite of the addition of § 4-109, California has still not adopted any parts
of the Code referring to process of posting. W. Willier & F. Hart, supra note 56, §§
4-109, -213. In fact, Nevada has followed California's lead in omitting any mention of
the process of posting. Id.
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4-109. The listing of steps that may be part of the process has created
uncertainty as to when the process of posting is complete. The first steps
listed, signature verification, inspection of the account, and stamping the
item "paid,"63
 are traditionally considered part of the action taken by a
bank in determining whether to pay. Similarly, the fourth step, charging the
account of the drawer," is the very act traditionally associated with comple-
tion of the process of posting. Difficulty arises, however, over the correct
meaning of the fifth step, which provides for "correcting or reversing an
entry or erroneous action.""
In the view of some observers, including a member of the Subcommittee
on Article Four, this step could be interpreted by a court to include as part
of the process of posting a reversal of an entry for any reason after the other
steps were taken." Under this interpretation, a reversal, as part of the
determination to pay, could take place at any time while an item could still
be returned as unacceptable and the process of posting would still not be
considered completed.
In a recent case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with precisely
the problem of reaching such an interpretation. It is appropriate, therefore,
to examine the result in this case.
IV. "FINAL PAYMENT') AS VIEWED BY THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
In West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank," the plaintiff West Side
Bank, the collecting bank, presented a check drawn on defendant Marine
National Exchange Bank, the payor bank, through the local clearing house.
Later that day, Marine began the processing of the item by sending it
through the electronic computer. As a part of the computer process, the
check was stamped "paid" and the drawer's account was charged. On the
following banking day, the item was photographed, cancelled and filed in
the drawer's account. Hours later, when the drawer issued to Marine a stop-
payment order, it withdrew that check from the drawer's files and notified
West Side that the check was being returned. The computer entries were
reversed that night, the drawer's account was credited, and the check was
returned to West Side the following morning at the clearing house exchange.
West Side brought suit against Marine on the check, claiming that Marine
was accountable for the amount of the item.
In its argument, West Side contended that Marine had completed the
process of posting as defined in section 4-109 before the effectuation of the
stop-payment order and had therefore finally paid the item under section
4-213(1) (c)." West Side's basic arguments leading to this conclusion may
be set out as follows: The process of posting as defined in section 4-109
envisions two different steps, a determination to pay and a recording of pay-
63 U.C.C. §§ 4-I09(a)-(c).
64 U.C.C. § 4-109(d).
63 U.C.C. § 4 - 109 (e)
66 Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform Commercial Code,
49 Marg. L. Rev. 331, 359 n.102; Note, supra note 28, at 717.
67 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968).
68 Brief for Appellant at 15.
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ment. The steps Marine had taken in processing the item—charging the
account, verifying the signature, ascertaining the sufficiency of funds, and
putting the check in the drawer's file—should constitute completion of the
process of posting, since they show that Marine had decided to pay and had
recorded payment. The key point in such a decision to pay should be when
the bookkeeper determines that the check is in good form and there are
sufficient funds to cover it; 69 and this decision had been made when Marine
performed the operations it did. Furthermore, insofar as the definition of
process of ,posting provides for "correcting or reversing an entry or errone-
ous action" as a typical step in the usual procedure," this is intended to
include correction of an error, and not reversal for any reason whatsoever."
The allowance of the inclusion in a bank's procedure of such a reversal
where there has been no error would incorrectly broaden the definition of
process of posting since it would allow a reversal up to the statutory or
consensual deadline imposed under section 4-213(1) (d). Under this inter-
pretation, section 4-213(1) (c) would have no operative effect as a deter-
minant of final payment, and the subsection (1) (d) deadline would be
the occasion of final payment in all cases in which- the item has not been
paid in cash, dishonored or finally settled T 2 West Side's interpretation, on
the other hand, would preserve the effectiveness of section 4-213(1) (c) by
allowing reversal only when a mechanical error had been made, and not
where a stop-payment order is received after there has been what would
otherwise amount to a decision to pay."
Marine contended, on the other hand, that the process of posting as
defined in section 4-109 had not been completed before the stop-order, and
that there was no final payment of the item under section 4-213(1)(c)."
Marine interpreted section 4-109 to include not only correction of erroneous
entries, but also the reversal of entries for any reason up to the occurrence
of the subsection (1) (d) deadline.75
 Marine emphasized that its "usual
procedure . . . in determining to pay" included a decision on whether to
reverse up to that time, and thus it was entitled to reverse at any time before
such return time and still be within the definition of process of posting.
Under this interpretation, it was argued that the item was not finally paid
under section 4-213(1) (c) since time remained for such a decision to be
made.7°
69 Id. at 16.
70 U.C.C. § 4-109.
71 Brief for Appellant at 21.
72 Id. at 23.
73 Id.
74 Brief for Respondent at 14.
75 Id.
70 Id. at 14-45. West Side maintained that the item had been finally paid by an
internal determination of the payor bank, and thus a clearing house rule which provided
that unacceptable items could be returned later than the time set out in the Code was
inapplicable. Brief for Appellant at 34. Marine contended, however, that the rule,
traditionally given the effect of preventing any final payment until the item could no
longer be returned, extended the period within which Marine could decide to reverse the
entry and return the item. Brief for Respondent at 3, 10-13. The court agreed with
Marine that final payment had been effectively postponed by the allowance of more
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The court held that Marine was not accountable for the item under
section 4-213, reasoning that: (1) payment was not final under section
4-213 because the process of posting had not been completed ; 77 and (2) the
process of posting had not been completed because section 4-109 allows an
entry to be reversed, not just correctedn—thus the "process of posting" is
not complete until a decision on whether to reverse is made, and this need
not be done until the time to return an item has expired.n
The court noted that section 4-109 defines "process of posting" as the
"usual procedure followed by a payor bank in determining to pay an item
and in recording the payment." It reasoned that the language of subsection
(e), "correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action," allowed, as part
of a bank's usual procedure, any reversal so long as the subsection (1) (d)
deadline has not supervened." The court concluded that Marine's usual
procedure included a decision on reversing as part of the decision to pay,
time to reverse the entry. 37 Wis. 2d at 674, 155 N.W.2d at 594. It is unclear, however,
exactly what the court's basis was for this decision. In addition to its reference to the rule
as allowing further postponement of a decision to reverse, the court emphasized the
traditional interpretation of such rules, which provide no payment can be final before
the clearing house deadline. Id.
Unless the court's decision in the West Side case was actually based on an inter-
pretation of 1 4-109, with the clearing house rule providing the deadline, the court
misinterpreted the effect of clearing house rules on the Code provisions. The traditional
view of such rules, that the item was finally paid only when no longer returnable, evolved
from early banking procedures, which required return of unacceptable items on the same
day as received. When this system proved to be infeasable, the banks agreed, in the
rules, that their interests would best be served by allowing unacceptable items to be
returned later, and thus provide more time for handling. These clearing house rules were
interpreted, in light of their purpose, was making payment final at the time specified,
since there was no provision for any different time for final payment. See Andrews,
supra note 36, at 168.
This interpretation of clearing house rules is no longer applicable under the Code.
The balancing provisions of § 4-213(1) allow for sufficient time to handle an item, in
§ 4-213(1) (d), while providing that earlier acts specified in (a) through (c) also amount
to final payment. See U.C.C. § 4-213, Comment 7. The official comments on final
payment refer to such rules simply as an extension of decision-making time when there
has been no final payment through other actions. U.C.C. § 4-213, Comments 4, 6. Thus
the clearing house rule does not negate the effect of 1 4-213, but supplements it by
specifying the time and manner for return of those items found unacceptable.
77 37 Wis. 2d at 674, 155 N.W.2d at 594.
78
 Id. at 672, 155 N.W.2d at 593.
79 Id. The court did not consider one of the contentions advanced by West Side
and rebutted by Marine; this contention involved § 4-303, which provides that the
"four legals" come "too late . . . if [the "legal"] is received , . . after the bank has
.. completed the process of posting the item ... or otherwise has evidenced . .. its
decision to pay the item." West Side contended that, for this reason, the stop-order came
too late, and Marine's actions were at least sufficient to give the item priority over the
stop-order and thereby create liability for failure of Marine to do so. Brief for Appellant
at 24. However, a bank's accountability for an item is created only by final payment,
and until that time there is no obligation to pay. Rather, the purpose of § 4-303 is to
relieve the payor bank of liability to its customer for failing to honor a stop-order.
This is accomplished by allowing the bank discretionary power to honor or dishonor
after the process of posting is substantially completed. See Leary, supra note 66, at
364-65. Thus there is no duty of a payer bank to give the item priority over the stop-
order, and West Side's contention was properly rejected.
80 37 Wis. 2d at 672, 155 N.W.2d at 593.
966
BANK PROCEDURES
and thus, since Marine postponed such a decision on reversal as long as time
remained to return the item, the process of posting could not have been
completed when the entry was reversed.
Although this interpretation may be technically possible in terms of
the language of section 4-109, it clearly cannot be the interpretation intended
by the Permanent Editorial Board." If section 4-109(e) is interpreted to
allow reversal at any time while the item may still be returned, then the
process of posting will have no autonomous meaning as a measuring point
for final payment. An item may be returnable under section 4-213(1) (d) so
long as the credit given the presenter for it remains provisional; determination
of the credit's provisional status would depend upon the time period fixed
by either the Code itself or by clearing house rule or agreement. 82 Such
provisional settlements will thus become final payment at the midnight dead-
line under section 4-301 or at a time provided by clearing house rule." Code
section 4-213, however, was drafted to make the earliest of the four distinct
events constitute final payment." Thus the court's interpretation of section
4-109 ignores one of the goals of Article 4, the fact that, for credit reasons,
it was drafted to allow the process of posting to be completed and payment
to be final as soon as possible after the item is received. 85 It was through
the difference between subsections (c) and (d) that a balance could be
achieved between protection against the customer's risk of loss and the payor's
desire for ample handling time. Protection of the owner of an item being
collected was completely disregarded in the interpretation of the process of
posting in the West Side case."
The observers" who feared interpretational difficulties with section
4-109(e) have suggested the more narrow construction, which was offered
by West Side Bank: that the subsection be limited to correction of entries
made in error, such as by charging the wrong account or involving an
incorrect amount.
The contention, however, would ignore the clear language of the Code,
which provides for "correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action."88
(Emphasis added.) The effect of West Side's interpretation, moreover, would
be to intensify the problems raised by computerized procedures. Under such
an interpretation, the payor bank might be reluctant to make an entry to the
account as the first step where reversals could be made only if the entry was
erroneous. It is arguable that the only entries that would qualify as erroneous
81 See U.C.C. § 4-213, Comment 7.
82 U.C.C. § 4-213(1) (d). See U.C.C. § 4-213, Comment 6.
83 Id.
84 U.C.C. § 4-213, Comment 7.
35 See U.C.C. §§ 4-101, Comment, -103, Comment 3.
86 The West Side court suggested that, if the result they reached was undesireable,
a legislative repeal of subsection (e) would be the proper remedy. 37 Wis. 2d at 671, 155
N.W.2d at 592. Vet even if subsection (e) were omitted, the same result could be
imputed, since the preamble to § 4-109 allows for other steps, and only lists subsections
(a) through (e) as illustrations. The absence of a specific step from the listing would
not prevent its implication into § 4-109 if part of a bank's procedure. Thus even omission
of subsection (e) would not prohibit inclusion of such a step.
87 See authorities cited note 66 supra.
88 U.C.C. § 4-109(e).
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would be such mechanical errors as charges to the wrong account and incor-
rect amounts. Other entries, such as those involving insufficient funds, forged
signatures, or preexisting stop orders, might not be considered reversible
on the basis that there was no mechanical error involved in making the
entry. Thus computerized banks would either have to change their procedure
or generally be liable once an entry is made since they could correct entries
only under limited circumstances. Clearly this interpretation of section 4-109
ignores the obvious purpose of the section—to make the process of posting
more flexible in terms of different banking procedures and thus promote
uniform adoption of the section on final payment, section 4-213.
In the West Side case, neither party offered the court an alternative
based upon both the language of section 4-109 and the policies underlying
its adoption. Such an interpretation is that subsection (e) of section 4-109
allows for both correcting and reversing entries, but that the step is to be
considered a step only in "recording the payment" and not in "determining
to pay." Both sides in the West Side case apparently assumed that such a
correcting or reversing was a decisional step, and part of the determination
to pay, as are subsections (a) and (b) of section 4-109, which refer to
signature verification and ascertaining sufficiency of funds. However, the
action involved in correcting or reversing is the same as that involved in
originally charging to the account. This action is clearly part of the recording
of payment and not part of the determination to pay. Subsection (c) involves
recording of payment on the instrument itself. Both (d) and (e) involve
the mechanical process of recording on the ledger of the bank (or through
its computer process) a decision that has taken place with respect to the
item. In effect, the actual step of reversing or correcting an entry is a record-
ing of nonpayment.
By considering the reversal of entries to be distinct from the determina-
tion to pay, the completion of the steps involved in making a determination,
when coupled with a recording of payment, will constitute completion of the
process of posting at a time distinct from the subsection (1) (d) deadline for
returning unacceptable items. If the usual procedure in a bank involves
recording payment as the last step, no problem would arise, since the process
of posting would not be complete until an entry was made; if a decision not
to pay was made, there would be no entry, and the item could be returned.
In banks where the usual procedure is to charge the item to the account
first, completion of the process of posting would be dependent upon the
payor bank making a determination to pay tthe item. Thus if an inspection
of the account showed the presence of a stop-order or insufficient funds, a
reversal could be made and the drawer's account credited. The reversal would
be allowed because there had been no decision to pay. On the other hand,
if the steps involved in determining to pay are completed (other than reversal
as a step in determination to pay), the process of posting is completed, and
payment is final. In the West Side case, the process of posting should have
been considered completed before the stop-order was received, since Marine
had taken sufficient steps to indicate both a determination to pay and a
recording; thus a reversal should not have been possible.
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V. CoNcLusioN
An interpretation of section 4-109 as providing for reversals and cor-
rections of entries only as a part of the procedure in recording payment is
the most sensible one, since it preserves a meaning for completion of the
process of posting as a measuring point of final payment distinct from the
expiration of the provisional-settlement time, and at the same time provides
the flexibility necessary to encompass varying banking procedures. As a
result,' section 4-213 is able to achieve both desired objectives of a set of
rules to govern collection procedures: reduction of risk by having provisional
settlements become final when the determination to pay and recording of
payment are completed, and allowance for sufficient time to handle a large
volume of items. The interpretation adopted by the court in the West Side
case, however, is unacceptable since it sacrifices one objective for the other.
WILLIAM B. SNEIRSON
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